Millet is on fire battalion ! was the first sentence I heard on Saturday December 29, 2007 about the event which will be discussed in this corner. My wife repeated what ba just listening through a telephone call. " be that the guerrillas went to the battalion ? It was a question logic in the context of our troubled country. I do not think they are so bold, I thought doubtfully.
So we began an extraordinary day in our lives. While other events had already lived in the previous own urban violence in Medellin, the event was presented as a unique opportunity to confront some positions on the perception of risk. Back to mind a phrase that I have defended in other articles of this corner: The risk exists in the storm! And there we were in the midst of the storm.
Papi 
see the smoke is coming out of the battalion ! The cry of my daughter was accompanied by the sound of several explosions. The thing looks serious, I thought with concern. My first decision was to give orders not to lean out the windows and put us on the lowest level of our house, then turned on the radio and TV in search of new information. It was not the guerrillas, it was an accident which left initial explosion of a grenade in the armory of the military garrison. That is the first confrontation with the studies on perception in general and the perception risk in particular ... the theoretical load.
Public perception of risk is not only based on natural phenomena technological causing it, is also based on beliefs (false or correct), on values \u200b\u200band cultural principles in the distorted information from different sources reported risk in historical tradition that is the universe of experience recipient agent, in its theoretical charge, in their emotions, and very low degree of probabilistic estimates of experts. This public perception builds its own risks, accepts or avoids, prioritizes, manages, represents and reports, in turn becomes a source of new risks [1]
Mijo sister called me crying, said that we must evacuate ! "Evacuate? Why? Were questions that were not my load theoretical response. Are exploiting grenades, mortars and ammunition and my house is about 500 meters away are exaggerating! Maybe it's a case of amplification of risk. I opened the door to my house to watch the reaction of my neighbors. I watched one with the face of concern, passing me said: brother out of here that if the fire reaches the basement ... fly shit hurdle!. Then he walked away with his family as a soul that takes the devil.
Millet turned to call his sister, is distraught and says they are going to evacuate if ! Finishing the sentence my wife heard a loud explosion followed by a vibration of the structure of our house. At that time remembered Cali blast, which devastated more than 40 blocks.
The August 7, 1956 in Cali, was recorded the most awful mess of industrial origin. Seven military trucks carrying 40 tons of gelatinous dynamite explode, wiping out more than 40 blocks in five neighborhoods in the city. The records EMDAT 2.700 dead, Cali talk to more than 10,000. "For three days straight, got trucks of corpses" is the testimony of one of the gravediggers in the city. "Flying fireballs, I thought the world was running out," says another of the witnesses of the disaster . [2]
To hell with my load theoretical, to hell with the risk, uncertainty reigns caution. Come immediately! I told my family and without further preparations we left the storm .
Outdoors carefully watching the reaction of other neighbors, it was my opportunity to study the risk ... the risk itself. Some, like us, left the scene, others were quiet as if nothing had happened and, more perplexed me, curiosity was invited to approach the scene. There were many onlookers leaning on balconies and rooftops or in the streets around the battalion. These neighbors did not perceive the risk was more morbid curiosity.
As we walked away, our car was listening to the news. Some residents near the scene refused to evacuate for fear that their homes stolen ! Said a civil defense official interviewed by the station that was tuned Please do not adhere to material things ! He said the people reluctant to evacuate. The perennial problem in the stool ... attachment to the material. Something similar happened in New Orleans and now with the imminent risk of Galeras volcano in Colombia and the Tungurahua volcano in Ecuador. It seems that only when the volcanic rocks or chips are on their heads, they will perceive the risk.
Across the city the perceived risk respond to psychological theories, especially the psychometric Paul Slovic et al. Far minimized the risk perception. Although seen the smoke that rose in the distance, there was increased interest in the event. We, the evacuees, relatábamos the event, but new risk recipients continued their daily lives as if nothing was happening.
The wait was long, the event had started around 10:30 am. At 3 pm still watching the smoke. When I saw the helicopter carrying water to douse the fire, I knew that the risk had passed, the storm had ceased. We returned to our home without hindrance, there were no restrictions on admission to our unit ... never existed.
Despite all the theories about perception, I am struck by the analysis of the Scottish philosopher David Hume around two concepts that we experienced in the storm: belief and uncertainty. The influence that may have a belief in perception, Hume brings as an example: "a coward, whose fears were easily aroused, nods easily to any news of the danger that you get, the same as a person sad and melancholy disposition is very gullible to everything that feeds his ruling passion " (Hume, 1738, p.67). There is then, according to Hume, a predisposition of some people to believe or forming beliefs about risks and has not been presented an external impression of it.
Emotions play an important role in the rationality or irrationality of our decisions. At first I was puzzled, then I was sure of my decision from my load theoretical uncertainty arose subsequently amended my belief: are exploding grenade ammunition, mortars and may explode something potentially destructive . " panic, helplessness, physical pain (sensation) and other emotions can delay important decisions " (Elster, 1996). Also occurred in the perception of risk with the people who did not evacuate. Staying in the area of \u200b\u200brisk, given the imminence of the risk, it could be an irrational decision, however, is not easy to know the emotions that led to such a decision. The uncertainty associated with the risk could give rise to the hope of the non-occurrence of a disaster, panic over the possible loss of the unique heritage of some families perhaps influenced the decision, attachment to material things, distrust of information from experts or any other causes are possible scenarios of multiple emotions that directly affect decision-making for risk.
Our decision to evacuate was rational from our belief. Another decision was irrational.
Finally, I highlight a phrase I heard that day on the radio: "There is no risk ... risk means that something can happen not will happen." Was the message from our Mayor. I conclude with this sentence because risk is a concept with which I totally agree. He highlighted the possibility of as a concept that justifies my disposal, but also turn justifies those who decided to stay ... but with one big difference: I did not lose anything wrong in my decision, what would have lost my neighbors if they had been wrong?
Bibliography
Hume, D. (1837), A Treatise of Human Nature: being an Attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects . Chile, Escuela de Filosofía Universidad ARCIS. Edición electrónica ( www.philosophia.cl ), 2004
Elster, J. Rationality and the Emotions , the Economic Journal, 106, 1996, 1386-1397.
Gunawardane, N & Noronha, F. Communicating Disasters. An Asia pacific Resource Book , 2007
[1] I'm not sure of his writing. In my quest for a bomb found under such designation only refers to bombs of World War II.
2] See Colombia country disaster risk in the Corner December 2005 ( www.rincondelriesgo. blogspot.com ) The EM-DAT is a a database of international disasters of the University of Louvain in Brussels, Belgium, ranks at the top Villatina disasters (sliding one of the slopes of Medellin), Armero (volcanic) and Cali (industrial accident scarcely known by many Colombians)
[3 ] Taken from one of the conclusions of my research on risk perception.
